The rise and fall of income inequality in Chile by unknown
The rise and fall of income inequality in Chile
Francisco Parro1 • Loreto Reyes2
Received: 6 January 2015 / Revised: 27 January 2017 /Accepted: 28 January 2017
 The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper presents evidence on a rise and fall in income inequality in
Chile during the past two decades. We show that income inequality rises from 1990
to 2000 and then falls from 2000 to 2011. We perform simple but informative
decompositions to figure out the contributing factors behind that dissimilarity in the
behavior of inequality across those two subperiods. Our results are consistent with a
story in which economic growth increases the demand for more educated workers,
initially increasing inequality. However, those higher returns to education encour-
age agents to invest in higher education, producing a subsequent human capital
deepening that reduces inequality at later stages of the development process.
Keywords Inequality  Labor markets  Skills
JEL Classifications J21  J31  J24
1 Introduction
This paper presents evidence on the evolution of income inequality in Chile during
the past two decades. We observe that income inequality rises from 1990 to 2000
and then falls from 2000 to 2011. The only exception is from 2006 to 2009, when
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dissimilarity in the behavior of income inequality across the pre- and post-2000
periods, we carry out a series of simple but informative decompositions to separate
the contributions of the different components of income inequality. The measure of
income inequality analyzed in this paper is the 80/20 ratio of per capita income.
While several other measures of inequality are used in the literature (for instance,
the Gini coefficient), the 80/20 ratio allows us to build our decompositions in an
easy and clearly interpretable way.1
We first show that labor income inequality accounts for most of the changes in
inequality observed during the whole period. Non-labor income inequality plays a
minor role. Then, we decompose labor income inequality into its three main
components: employment, hours worked conditional on being employed, and hourly
wages. We show that the employment gap between the richest and poorest quintiles
is particularly relevant for explaining the rise in income inequality from 2006 to
2009. Without changes in the employment gap, the trend of labor income inequality
would resemble a perfectly inverted U-shaped curve. That is, we would observe a
continuous rise of labor income inequality before 2000, followed by a continuous
fall after 2000. Moreover, we show that the inverted U-shaped movement of labor
income inequality among employed agents is almost entirely accounted for by a rise
and fall in hourly wage inequality during the pre- and post-2000 periods,
respectively. Inequality in hours worked has no relevant role.
Changes in hourly wage inequality could be explained by differences in
observable characteristics, such as experience and education; different prices for
different skills in the labor market; and unobservables, that is, differences in prices
and skills within groups. To disentangle the relative importance of those
components of hourly wage inequality, we perform a decomposition in the spirit
of Juhn et al. (1993). We show that both observable prices and quantities are
important forces behind the rise and fall of hourly wage inequality. We discuss the
forces moving the supply of and demand for different skills in the labor market. The
evidence and discussion presented in this paper are consistent with a story in which
several forces inherent to economic growth increase the demand for more educated
workers and, therefore, the returns to education and inequality in earnings. As the
supply of educated workers—especially those from more vulnerable groups—
begins to respond, the rise in income inequality is moderated or even reversed. Our
results point to education policies as the most effective way of reducing income
inequality levels in the long term.
Most of the evidence on income inequality for Chile is concentrated on the pre-
2000 period, when income inequality slightly increased. The exceptions are some
regional studies that mainly provide evidence on the contribution of price and
1 In general, the conclusions of studies using different inequality measures are not significantly
dependent on the inequality measure used (see, for instance, Lustig et al. 2013 and Azevedo et al. 2013a).
Therefore, given the consistent results obtained by others using different inequality measures, we decided
to report results for only a single inequality indicator. We decided to use the 80/20 measure as the main
engine of our analysis because of the proportionality property of this ratio. It allows us to dissect, step by
step and within a unified framework, several of the forces behind the evolution of overall income
inequality. The use of alternative inequality measures would not significantly alter our main conclusions
and would come at the cost of sacrificing the clarity with which we present and interpret our main results.
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quantity effects to the changes in the distribution of hourly wages (for instance,
Azevedo et al. 2013a). Among the articles looking at inequality in Chile, only a
fraction of them center the discussion on the forces that could explain the evolution
of income inequality (Cowan and Gregorio 1996; Bravo and Marinovic 1997;
Solimano and Torche 2007; Eberhard and Engel 2008). Other articles point to
different issues that are related to inequality but not directly to its determinants. For
instance, Contreras et al. (2004), Denis et al. (2007), and Sapelli (2013) study inter-
and intragenerational mobility, Engel et al. (1999) and Bravo et al. (2001) quantify
the redistributive effects of tax and social policies, Ruiz-Tagle (2007) forecasts
future trends in income inequality, and Contreras and Ruiz-Tagle (1997) present
evidence on inequality at the regional level in Chile.
Moreover, those studies analyzing the determinants of income inequality in Chile
mainly focus on the reasons why income inequality was high and relatively
stable during the pre-2000 period in the context of the rapid growth of the Chilean
economy. Our paper provides a more complete picture of the forces driving both the
rise and fall of income inequality in Chile, through the use of simple decompositions
based on the 80/20 ratio. As far as we know, no other study on Chile provides the
type of analysis that we perform in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes and discusses
the available evidence on income inequality in Chile as well as other countries of
the region. Section 3 documents trends in income inequality over the past two
decades and analyzes the importance of labor markets for understanding its
evolution over time. Section 4 dissects labor income inequality into its three main
components: wages, hours worked, and employment gaps. Section 5 decomposes
changes in hourly wage inequality into observable quantities, prices, and
unobservables, and discusses the main forces behind the documented evolution of
the returns to higher education. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
In this section, we summarize and discuss the main findings of the literature that
analyzes income inequality in Chile and other Latin American countries. This
broader discussion, not exclusively focused on Chile, allows a better understanding
of both the common elements in the evolution of income inequality between Chile
and the region and the particularities of the Chilean case. We start by discussing
articles that study the evolution and determinants of income inequality for a group
of Latin American countries. Then, we summarize the evidence for Chile. We
conclude by discussing how this article fits with and contributes to the existing
literature explored in this section.
Lustig et al. (2013) provide evidence on a rise and fall in income inequality in
Latin America during recent decades. The authors document that, after rising in the
1990s, income inequality declined in 13 of 17 Latin American countries during the
period 2000–2010. To understand the post-2000 decline of income inequality in the
region, the authors carry out an in-depth analysis of the experiences of Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico. From the analysis of those countries, the authors extract several
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conclusions: (1) labor income inequality played a major role in the decline in overall
inequality, especially in Argentina and Mexico; (2) changes in hourly wages were
equalizing during the post-2000 period in the three countries they analyze2; (3)
changes in the distribution of hourly wages were mainly driven by a price effect,
that is, by a fall in the skill premium; and (4) more progressive government transfers
were the main equalizing force behind the decline in non-labor income inequality in
the three countries. Other studies for specific countries extract similar conclusions
[Gasparini and Cruces (2010) and Bergolo et al. (2011) for Argentina; Barros et al.
(2010) for Brazil; Esquivel et al. (2010) and Campos et al. (2012) for Mexico,
among others].
Additional evidence documenting a decline in income inequality in the region
during the post-2000 period is provided by Azevedo et al. (2013b). To understand
the main forces behind this phenomenon, the authors perform a parametric
decomposition in the spirit of Juhn et al. (1993) for 14 Latin American countries.
The authors conclude that changes in labor income were the most important
contributor to the decline in inequality across countries in Latin America. Changes
in non-labor income were also equalizing but, in general, their relative contribution
to the decline in income inequality was smaller than that of labor income. The
authors report that the main factor behind the decline in non-labor income inequality
was the increase in public transfers.
Azevedo et al. (2013a) use a Juhn–Murphy–Pierce methodology to quantify the
relative contribution of a quantity effect and a price effect on changes in hourly
wages. The results of the decomposition show that the falling returns to skills, for
both education and experience, were, on average, the main force behind the post-
2000 decline in labor income inequality in Latin America. The quantity effect,
however, made a small contribution to reducing inequality. In addition, consistent
with the conclusions in Lustig et al. (2013) and Azevedo et al. (2013b), the authors
report that even though the contribution of labor income inequality to total
household income inequality in Latin America has decreased, it remains the main
contributor to inequality.
Gasparini et al. (2011) focus their analysis on the skill premium. Using the
canonical supply demand framework proposed by Katz and Murphy (1992), the
authors estimate the relative contribution of supply and demand factors to the trends
in the skill premium for tertiary and secondary educated workers. The decompo-
sition performed by Gasparini et al. (2011) shows that supply side factors seem to
have limited explanatory power relative to demand-side factors regarding the post-
2000 fall in the wage premium. In addition they find that changes in labor
regulations, such as legal minimum wages, also exhibit limited explanatory power.
The analysis of income inequality for Chile is heavily concentrated on the pre-
2000 period, when income inequality slightly increased. The existing articles on
income inequality study different dimensions of it: inter- and intragenerational
2 However, the analysis for Argentina suggests that the expansion of employment as a consequence of
the economic recovery after the 2002 crisis was also an important factor behind the decline in labor
income inequality. For Brazil and Mexico, this was not the case.
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mobility, the redistributive effects of tax and social policies, the determinants of
income inequality, and their relation with poverty levels, among others.
A first group of articles analyze income inequality in a dynamic context by
studying the degree of inter- and intragenerational mobility in the Chilean economy.
Sapelli (2013) estimates different intragenerational mobility indicators for Chile
with data extracted from three waves of the CASEN Panel Survey (1996, 2001, and
2006). The author documents evidence of high levels of mobility in Chile. Sapelli
(2013) concludes that although the income distribution in Chile presents relatively
high levels of inequality, individuals, indeed, move significantly along the
distribution over time. Contreras et al. (2004) estimate intergenerational mobility
by computing transition matrixes for different deciles of the income distribution.
The authors use panel data from the CASEN Panel Survey (1996 and 2001). They
find that mobility is high in the first nine deciles but low to and from the tenth
decile. Related to these studies, Denis et al. (2007) use the CASEN Panel Survey
(1996, 2001, 2006) to study mobility to and from a state of poverty. The authors find
evidence of highly dynamic entry and exit from poverty.
A second group of studies focus on the distributional effects of tax and social
policies. Engel et al. (1999) quantify the distributional impact of the Chilean tax
system and assess the sensitivity of the distribution of income to changes in the
structure of taxes and rates. The authors use data from the 1996 CASEN survey
merged with information on incomes extracted from the Internal Revenue Service.
The main finding of the study is that the tax system has a little effect on the income
distribution. They also show that major changes in the tax structure do not
significantly affect the income distribution either. Related to the issue explored by
Engel et al. (1999) and Bravo et al. (2001) use data from the CASEN surveys for
the years 1990, 1994, 1996, and 1998 to analyze how equalizing social policy was
during the period 1990–1998. Their results show a positive short-term impact of
social policy on the income distribution.
Contreras et al. (2008) use panel data for the years 1996 and 2001 and cross-
sectional data for the years 1990 and 2003 to evaluate whether Chilean growth has
been ‘‘pro poor’’. The authors find that economic growth has significantly reduced
poverty during the period analyzed, but income convergence is found only for the
poorest half of the income distribution.
A third group of studies directly address the determinants of income inequality.
Most of them analyze the reasons why income inequality during the pre-2000 period
was so stable or slightly increasing (depending on the inequality measure used) in
the context of strong economic growth. Cowan and Gregorio (1996) document a
slight increase in income inequality during the period 1992–1994 (a very short
period of time). The authors attribute the rise in inequality during those years to
changes in labor market conditions originating in cyclical movements of economic
activity. In addition, they argue that despite the historically high inequality in Chile
in the period analyzed, significant improvements in social indicators were observed
during that decade: poverty diminished significantly, consumption by households
rose, and quality-of-life indicators placed Chile in a privileged position among Latin
American countries.
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Bravo and Marinovic (1997) describe the evolution of wage inequality in the
Chilean labor market using data for the city of Santiago in the period 1957–1996.
The authors report an increase in wage inequality for most of the period of analysis,
especially between 1957 and 1988. They conclude that long-run changes in relative
wages can be mainly explained by observable variables.
Solimano and Torche (2007) analyze the evolution of income inequality during
the period 1987–2006 using data from the CASEN surveys. They conclude that
income inequality is largely explained by the impact of the tenth decile and, in
general, by inequality between deciles rather than inequality within these groups. In
addition, the authors conclude that the descending section of the Kuznets curve is
not observed during the period analyzed. However, they speculate that the
relationship proposed by the Kuznets curve could be observed in the future,
although they recognize that it is difficult to establish when. The authors also
confirm the sensitivity of the income distribution to inequality in access to a good-
quality education. They show that the Gini coefficient decreases significantly if
tertiary education expands.
Eberhard and Engel (2008) study wage inequality in Chile by decomposing the
variance of log-wages into the sum of the within- and between-group variances. The
data used were extracted from the annual Employment and Unemployment Survey
conducted by the Universidad de Chile for the period 1975–2006. The authors show
that most of the downward trend in inequality from 1995 onward were explained by
the dynamics of the standard deviation between cohorts. In addition, they speculate
that fluctuations in the between-group standard deviation during the last decade of
their period of study can be attributed to a major increase in the share of workers
with a tertiary education that originates with the deregulation of the higher
education market in 1980.
Other studies on Chile approach inequality from a different perspective than the
articles previously discussed. Contreras and Ruiz-Tagle (1997) study inequality in
Chile but at the regional level. Their analysis reveals significant disparities in the
behavior of the income distribution at the regional level. They attribute this result to
the varying evolution of labor market demand in distinct geographical zones. Ruiz-
Tagle (2007) deviates from the analysis of the determinants of income inequality
and raises the question of what we can expect to happen with income inequality in
the future. To do so, the author builds microsimulations to forecast future trends in
income inequality. His main conclusion is that wage inequality will remain high for
the next 10-year period (from that article’s year of publication). The author argues
that the structure of the Chilean labor market appears to imply that there is a high
level of underlying wage inequality, although the labor market structure seems to
prevent further increases in wage inequality.
In sum, the evidence for Latin American countries shows a rise and fall in income
inequality in the region,mostly led by a decline in labor income inequality. In addition,
formost of the countries, a fall in the skill premium is themain force behind the decline
in labor income inequality.Whether market forces or institutional factors are the main
contributing factor to the fall in the skill premium is still an open question, and the
available evidence is heterogeneous across countries. For Chile, most of the evidence
are concentrated on the pre-2000 period. The exceptions are regional studies that
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mainly provide evidence on the price-quantity contribution to changes in hourly
wages. Studies focused on theChilean case address different dimensions of inequality.
Those studying the determinants of income inequality mainly concentrate on
understanding the relative stability of inequality during the period 1990–2000,
despite the rapid economic growth.Moreover, none of them provide a unifying picture
of the phenomenon. In this paper, we implement simple decompositions based on the
80/20 ratio to dissect, step by step and within a unified framework, the forces driving
the rise and fall of income inequality in Chile.
3 Income inequality trends
In this section, we document the path that income inequality followed during the
past two decades. We use data from the The Socioeconomic Characterization
Survey (CASEN). CASEN is a cross-sectional household survey conducted every 2
or 3 years by the Ministry of Social Development to characterize the population in
terms of demographic, educational, health, housing, employment, and income
issues. The information derived from CASEN is mainly used to estimate the
magnitude of poverty and the income distribution and to evaluate the impact of
different social programs targeted to the most vulnerable groups in the population.
Since the first year in which it collected data, CASEN has increased the number of
surveyed households, reaching 87,000 households in 2011. Table 1 describes the
sample size for each of the years included in our analysis.
We first report the 80/20 ratio for per capita income for the period 1990–2011.
We denote by yi;a;j;t the income of type i earned by agent a who belongs to quintile j
at time t. In addition, we denote by Nj;t the total number of agents in quintile j at
time t. Then, we define the 80/20 ratio for per capita income at time t, RTI;t, as
3













3 We follow the definition of quintiles provided by the CASEN surveys and compute the weighted
average of the income of members of the respective quintile. According to CASEN, a national quintile is
one-fifth or 20% of households in the nation ranked in ascending order according to per capita household
income, where the first quintile represents the poorest 20% of households and the fifth quintile represents
the richest 20% of households. In turn, the per capita household income is the ratio between the
autonomous household income and the number of people that constitute that household.










where TI denotes total income and j ¼ 1 and j ¼ 5 refer to the first quintile and the
fifth quintile of the income distribution, respectively. Figure 1 presents the evolu-
tion of income inequality (i.e., the 80/20 ratio, RTI;t) over the last 20 years.
We observe, in Fig. 1, a rise and fall in income inequality. The 80/20 ratio
increases from 19.4 in 1990 to 22.9 in 2000, and then it falls from 2000 to 2011. The
decreasing trend after 2000 is interrupted only by a rise in the 80/20 ratio from 2006
to 2009.
A first element that can influence the evolution of the ratio RTI;t is the fraction of
agents that are not potential income earners in the richest quintile and the poorest
quintile. For instance, if a rich and a poor household receive exactly the same level
of income, but the number of children in the poor household is higher than that in
the rich household, the ratio RTI;t will be higher than in the case where the same
number of children is present in both households.
We define potential income earners as agents that are 18 years old or older.
Figure 2 shows that the fraction of potential income earners is higher in the fifth
than in the first quintile. However, a convergence is observed in Fig. 2. This
convergence could possibly be related to the well-documented demographic
transition, observed in most countries, in which fertility rates have fallen over the
past decades, especially in more vulnerable socioeconomic groups.
To formally evaluate the importance of this element for understanding the trends
observed in Fig. 1, we graph the 80/20 ratio RTI;t considering only agents who are
18 years old or older (potential income earners). Figure 3 exhibits the results. As
expected, we observe that the level of income inequality is lower when we consider
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Fig. 1 80/20 ratio for total income
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poorest households, compared with that in the richest households, explains this result.
For instance, in 1990, the average number of children in a household belonging to the
first quintile was 2.4, whereas in the fifth quintile, that figure was 1.3 children. In 2011,
the difference in the average number of children in the first and fifth quintiles was 0.6.
The trend seems to be roughly the same as the one observed in Fig. 1.
We can quantify the contribution of this type of demographic factor to the
movement in overall inequality by expressing the 80/20 ratio as follows:
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Fig. 3 80/20 ratio for total income of potential income earners
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where RTI;tj18 age is the 80/20 ratio for the per capita income of potential income
earners, k1;t is the fraction of potential income earners in the first quintile, and k5;t is
the fraction of potential income earners in the fifth quintile. Equation (2) produces a
good approximation of RTI;t since the income earned by agents defined as potential
non-income earners (those younger than 18) is close to zero.
From Eq. (2), we can compute the inequality level that would exist if there had
been no difference in the fraction of income earners (that is,
k5;t
k1;t
¼ 1). Building that
counterfactual, we can express the contribution of differences in the fraction of non-
income earners to total income inequality in period t as:
CNIE;t 
RTI;t  RTI;tjage 18
RTI;t
 100; ð3Þ
where CNIE;t denotes the contribution of the difference between quintiles in the
fraction of non-income earners to total inequality.
Figure 4 presents the results. We observe that the contribution of the fraction of
non-income earners to the income inequality level is decreasing over time.
Specifically, it falls from 30.5% in 1990 to 22.8% in 2011. As explained before, this
decreasing role of the relative fraction of non-income earners in explaining overall
inequality trends could be related to the observed convergence in fertility rates
among households from different socioeconomic groups.
We can also compute what fraction of the change in inequality over a period is
attributable to this type of demographic factor. To do so, we take the derivative with
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Fig. 4 Contribution of the fraction of income earners to total inequality level (%)
 3 Page 10 of 31 Lat Am Econ Rev  (2017) 26:3 
123
Then, using data from CASEN, we can decompose the total change in income
inequality during the periods t  1 and t as follows4
RTI;t  RTI;t1  ðRTI;tjage 18  RTI;t1jage 18Þ k5;tk1;t
 






where the overline represents the average value of the variable during the period.
The first element of the right-hand side of Eq. (5) is the contribution of income
inequality among potential earners to overall inequality. The second element is the
contribution of the demographic factor (differences in the fraction of potential
income earners across quintiles). Table 2 presents the results of the decomposition
described by Eq. (5) in levels and percentages.





contribution to the total change in income inequality. In each subperiod, changes in
the 80/20 ratio for per capita income of the population 18 years or older are what
account for the total change in income inequality. Demographic factors are
important for explaining the level of inequality (because of the different fractions of
non-income earners in the poorest and richest quintiles) but are less important as
determinants of changes in inequality.
The next step is to understand the sources of inequality behind the ratio
RTI;tjage 18. To simplify the notation, denote by RPTI;t the 80/20 ratio for the total
income of potential earners. We can decompose the total income of each agent a
who belongs to quintile j as:
yTI;a;j;t ¼ yLI;a;j;t þ yNLI;a;j;t; ð6Þ
where LI denotes labor income and NLI denotes non-labor income. Using Eq. (6),
we can decompose the 80/20 ratio as the weighted sum of the 80/20 ratio for labor
income and the 80/20 ratio for non-labor income.5
RPTI;t ¼ RPLI;taLI;t þ RPNLI;tð1 aLI;tÞ; ð7Þ
where aLI;t is the share of labor income in the poorest quintile at time t.
Denote by CLI;t the contribution of labor income to total inequality at each period
t. We can compute CLI;t as:
4 t and t  1 refer to two arbitrary, not necessarily consecutive, years—for instance, 1992 and 1990 for
the first subperiod of analysis.
5 We derive Eq. (7) as follows. First, we start from the definition of RPTI;t in an analogous formulation to
the one used in Eq. (1) for the total income 80/20 ratio. Then, we split the right-hand side into the
components corresponding to the labor income and the non-labor income of the richest quintile. After
that, we divide the numerator and denominator of the first term (the per capita labor income of the richest
quintile over the per capita total income of the poorest quintile) by the per capita labor income of the
poorest quintile. Analogously, we divide the second term (the per capita non-labor income of the richest
quintile over the per capita total income of the poorest quintile) by the per capita non-labor income of the




a¼1ðyLI;a;1;t þ yNLI;a;1;tÞ we get Eq. (7).





Figure 5 shows that more than 80% of inequality in each period are attributable to
the inequality in labor income.
From Eq. (7) we can derive a formula to formally decompose the change in the
80/20 ratio over a period into its three components: the change in the ratio of labor
income, the change in the ratio of non-labor income, and the change in the share a.





aLI;t þ oRNLI;tot ð1 aLI;tÞ þ
oaLI;t
ot
ðRLI;t  RNLI;tÞ: ð9Þ
Therefore, we can decompose the total change in income inequality during the
period t  1 and t as follows:
RTI;t  RTI;t1  ðRLI;t  RLI;t1ÞaLI þ ðRNLI;t  RNLI;t1Þð1 aNLIÞ
þ ðaLI;t  aLI;t1ÞðRLI  RNLIÞ:
ð10Þ
The first component of Eq. (10) shows the contribution to the change in total
income inequality that is due to changes in labor income inequality. The second
component represents changes that are due to non-labor income inequality. The
third component is the change attributable to the variation in the labor income share.
Dividing the right-hand side of Eq. (10) by RLI;t  RLI;t1, we can get the percentage
contribution of each component to the total change in income inequality. Table 3
presents these results.6
Table 3 suggests that the labor market has been the main force behind the rise
and fall of income inequality during the last 20 years. For instance, from 1990 to
2000, labor income inequality, on average, accounts for practically all of the
Table 2 Decomposition of changes in total income inequality
Period Levels Percentages (%)
R(C18 years old) k5=k1 R(C18 years old) k5=k1
1990–1992 -0.70 -0.19 78.25 21.75
1992–1994 1.18 -0.56 191.53 -91.53
1994–1996 0.89 0.27 76.84 23.16
1996–1998 2.36 -0.60 134.01 -34.01
1998–2000 1.29 -0.43 149.25 -49.25
2000–2003 -2.79 0.08 103.07 -3.07
2003–2006 -1.73 -0.74 70.03 29.97
2006–2009 2.70 -0.27 111.27 -11.27
2009–2011 -2.50 0.36 116.74 -16.74
6 Unfortunately, the 2003 survey does not include data on labor income (only labor income in the main
occupation). Therefore, for that year, we impute labor income simply as the average of the years 2000 and
2006.
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increase in the 80/20 ratio of total income within each subperiod. From 2000 to
2011, 80% of the variation in the 80/20 ratio is accounted for by changes in labor
income inequality.
Summing up, income inequality, measured as the ratio of the per capita income in
the richest quintile over that in the poorest quintile, behaves differently over the two
different subperiods. The 80/20 ratio rises from 1990 to 2000 and then falls from
2000 to 2011. Decomposing changes in inequality into a demographic factor
(changes in the fraction of potential income earners in each quintile) and changes in
the per capita income received by potential income earners, we find that the latter
factor is the most important for understanding the rise and fall of income inequality


















1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009 2011
Fig. 5 Contribution of labor income to the income inequality level (%)
Table 3 Decomposition of changes in total income inequality among potential earners
Period Levels Percentages (%)
Labor Non-labor Share Labor Non-labor Share
1990–1992 -0.39 0.07 -0.17 80.04 -13.89 33.84
1992–1994 1.13 -0.34 0.06 133.90 -40.73 6.83
1994–1996 0.39 0.30 -0.05 60.48 46.77 -7.25
1996–1998 1.35 0.27 0.09 78.91 15.54 5.55
1998–2000 1.02 -0.07 -0.06 113.90 -7.45 -6.45
2000–2003 -0.96 -1.06 0.00 47.42 52.60 -0.03
2003–2006 -0.94 -0.30 -0.08 71.03 23.07 5.90
2006–2009 2.31 -0.05 -0.16 109.62 -2.17 -7.45
2009–2011 -1.78 -0.12 -0.05 91.24 6.25 2.50
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income, is the main contributor to the income inequality trends in Chile during the
last 20 years. Therefore, labor markets play a big role. The next section dissects
labor income inequality into its two main components: wages, hours worked, and
employment gaps.7
4 Inequality in the labor market: wages, hours worked,
and employment gaps
To further understand the sources of inequality in the labor market, we decompose
the average monthly per capita labor compensation of the poorest and richest
quintiles into their three main components: employment levels, hours worked
conditional on being employed, and hourly wages.
We first compute the average per capita labor compensation derived from the
main occupation (this type of income represents nearly 90% of total labor income)
for agents ages 18 or older (potential income earners). Defining yLIMO;a;j;t as the
labor income in the main occupation of potential income earner a in quintile j at
time t, and Nj;tjage 18 as the total number of agents ages 18 or older, we can define









Figure 6 shows that the 80/20 ratio for this type of income follows a similar pattern
as total income inequality.
Per capita labor income can differ between quintiles because of differences in
employment levels, differences in hours worked conditional on being employed,
and differences in the average hourly wage earned by agents in each quintile. To
understand the relative importance of each of those factors, we start computing the
80/20 ratio for per capita labor income by considering only individuals who report
positive hours worked (specifically, those who report a positive labor income in
their main occupation); that is, the ratio between the average per capita labor
income of workers belonging to the poorest quintile and the richest quintile.
Defining RELIMO;t as the 80/20 ratio for the labor income of only agents with
positive hours worked (employed agents), we have:
7 We must note that most surveys are weak at capturing different sources of non-labor income. This is a
common problem in all the articles discussed in Sect. 2 that use as their data source the same type of
survey as the one used in this article. In addition, non-labor income is a very heterogeneous concept.
Some of its components, such as profits, interests, and rents, tend to be concentrated at the top of the
income distribution, whereas other components, such as remittances and government transfers, are
concentrated in the middle and lower ranges of the income distribution. Therefore, it is difficult to
establish the direction of the bias produced by survey data in the estimates of the contribution of non-
labor income to overall inequality. Recently, a growing literature has combined survey data with national
accounts and tax registries to measure both labor and non-labor income inequality (see Lawson et al.
2014; Bricker et al. 2016; Meyer and Mittag 2015; Meyer et al. 2015, among others).










Figure 7 presents the results. We again observe a rise in income inequality during
1990–2000 and a fall during 2000–2011. However, two main facts distinguish the
evolution of inequality exhibited by Figs. 6 and 7. First, the rise of inequality during
the period 2006–2009 does not appear when we consider only agents with positive
hours worked. Second, the fall in inequality is much more pronounced in Fig. 7 than
in Fig. 6.
Employment gaps between the richest and poorest quintiles are particularly
relevant for understanding the deviation from the increasing trend of inequality
during the 1990–2000 period and from the decreasing trend during the 2000–2011
period. For instance, employment gaps account for most of the increase in labor
income inequality from 2003 to 2009. Therefore, when keeping constant the
inequality in access to employment, the pattern of the rise and fall of income
inequality becomes clearer.
The perfectly inverted U-shape of the ratio RELIMO;t could be explained by two
factors: a gap in wages and a gap in hours worked. To disentangle the contribution
of those factors, we compute the average per capita hours worked in the respective
quintile for agents ages 18 or older who earn a positive income in their main
occupation. With that information, we can compute the average hourly wages of




where yeLIMO;j;t is the per capita income earned by agents 18 or older in their main
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Fig. 6 80/20 ratio for labor income in the main occupation
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capita hours worked. Figures 8 and 9 exhibit the 80/20 ratio for wages and hours
worked, respectively. We observe that the gap in hours worked remains relatively
stable during the whole period. In contrast, the wage gap shows a similar pattern to
the one exhibited by labor income inequality.
As we did before, we can formally decompose the total change in labor income
inequality into changes derived from wages and from hours worked. The 80/20 ratio
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Fig. 8 80/20 ratio for wages
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Rh;t þ oRh;tot Rw;t: ð15Þ
As before, we can use the following approximation of Eq. (15):
RELIMO;t  RELIMO;t1  ðRw;t  Rw;t1ÞRh þ ðRh;t  Rh;t1ÞRw: ð16Þ
Dividing Eq. (16) by RELIMO;t  RELIMO;t1, we get the percentage contribution of
wages and hours worked to changes in labor income inequality. Figure 10 presents
the results of that decomposition. During the period 1990–2000, changes in relative
wages account for the entire change in labor income inequality. During the period
2000–2011, the narrowing wage gap observed in Fig. 8 accounts for 135% of the
change in total income inequality, which means that hours worked was a source of
higher and not lower inequality during that period.
Therefore, we can conclude that a widening gap between the wages of the
richest and poorest quintiles is the main contributor to the increase in labor
income inequality during 1990–2000. The narrowing wage gap from 2000 to
2011 accounts for most of the decrease in labor income inequality during that
period. The following section discusses some potential explanations for that
phenomenon.
5 Decomposing the changes in hourly wage inequality
From the previous section, we can extract two main lessons. First, labor markets
have been the main source of inequality over the last 20 years in the Chilean
economy. Second, a widening of the gap between the hourly wages earned by the
richest and the poorest quintiles pushed inequality up during the 1990–2000 period,
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Fig. 9 80/20 ratio for hours worked
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whereas a narrowing gap decreased inequality during 2000–2011.8 Particularly,
striking is the strong decrease in relative hourly wages during 2000–2011. In this
section, we discuss some possible explanations for the observed pattern of wages
over the last two decades.
The hourly wage earned by agents in the labor market mainly depends on two
factors: first, the endowment of skills and, second, the market prices of those skills.
Experience and education are the main observable skills that affect hourly wages in
the labor market. There could also be unobservable differences among individuals
within those categories. For instance, given some level of education and experience,
individuals could differ in soft skills, such as perseverance and motivation. In
addition, relative prices of different skills will also affect the hourly wages that
agents earn in the labor market. Even though the relative endowment of skills
remains constant over time, changes in the relative prices of those skills will affect
the relative wage that agents receive in the labor market.
In this section, we decompose the change in hourly wage inequality into changes
in inequality across observable dimensions of skills (experience and education, and
their prices) and changes in inequality within schooling and experience groups. We
first graph the evolution of the average hourly wages that agents in the fifth quintile
earn relative to those earned by agents in the first quintile. We define the hourly
wage of each agent as the ratio between the monthly labor income in the main
occupation over the average monthly hours worked. Notice that this definition is
slightly different from the one used to build Fig. 8, which allowed us to perform the



















Fig. 10 Contribution of wages and hours worked to changes in labor income inequality (%)
8 The gap in employment levels accounts for some deviations of labor income inequality from the
increasing trend before 2000 and the decreasing trend after 2000. For instance, a rise in the employment
gap (in favor of the richest quintile) accounts for the whole increase in labor income inequality during
2006–2009.
 3 Page 18 of 31 Lat Am Econ Rev  (2017) 26:3 
123
We observe that the average hourly wage gap shows a moderate rise during
1990–2000 and a steep drop during 2000–2011. To shed some light on the forces
behind the evolution of relative hourly wages (especially on the drop in the wage
gap during 2000–2011), we use some variations on the methodology proposed by
Juhn et al. (1993). We start by writing a wage equation as:
lnwa;t ¼ Xa;tbt þ ua;t; ð17Þ
where lnwa;t is the log hourly wage for agent a in year t, Xa;t is a vector of individual
characteristics (education and experience,9) and ua;t is the component of wages
accounted for by the unobservables. We assume that ua;t satisfies standard OLS
assumptions.
It is useful to think of the residual of Eq. (17) as two components: an individual’s
percentile in the residual distribution, Ha;t, and the distribution function of the wage
equation residuals, FtðÞ. Let Ftð:=Xa;tÞ be the conditional cumulative distribution of
the residuals for year t. Then, Eq. (17) can be expressed as:
lnwa;t ¼ Xa;tbt þ F1ðHa;t=Xa;tÞ; ð18Þ
where F1ðHa;t=Xa;tÞ is the inverse cumulative residual distribution for workers
with characteristics Xt in year t.
Then, changes in inequality come from three sources: (1) changes in the
distribution of individual characteristics (education and experience), that is, changes
in the X0s; (2) changes in the prices of observable skills (changes in the b0s); and (3)













Fig. 11 Change in the 80/20 ratio for hourly wages
9 Data from CASEN do not allow us to collect information on the actual experience of an individual, so
we decided to use potential experience instead. Potential experience was built as age-years of schooling-
6.
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Using this framework, we can simulate the distribution of earnings for each
period t by keeping some components fixed. First, define b to be the average prices
for observables over the whole period and Fð:=Xa;tÞ to be the average cumulative
distribution. With fixed observable prices and fixed residual distribution, wages
would be determined as:
lnw1a;t ¼ Xa;tbþ F1ðHa;t=Xa;tÞ: ð19Þ
If we want to allow both observable prices and observable quantities to vary over
time, then we can generate wages by:
lnw2a;t ¼ Xa;tbt þ F1ðHa;t=Xa;tÞ: ð20Þ
Finally, by allowing observable prices and quantities and the distribution of resid-
uals to change over time, we compute wages as:
lnw3a;t ¼ Xa;tbt þ F1ðHa;t=Xa;tÞ ¼ lnwa;t ð21Þ

















From Eqs. (22) to (24), we can compute the contribution of quantities, prices, and
unobservables to total inequality in period t as follows:
RX;t ¼ R1w;t; ð25Þ
Rb;t ¼ R2w;t  R1w;t; ð26Þ
Ru;t ¼ R3w;t  R2w;t; ð27Þ
where RX;t;Rb;t, and Ru;t are the contribution of quantities, prices, and unobserv-
ables, respectively, to total hourly wage inequality (the 80/20 ratio) in period t.
Notice that:
Rw;t ¼ RX;t þ Rb;t þ Ru;t: ð28Þ
Next, we quantify the contribution of quantities, prices, and unobservables to
changes in the 80/20 ratio over time. To do so, we use two different methodologies.
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We use the approach proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) and the adaptation proposed by
Azevedo et al. (2013a).
Juhn et al. (1993) attribute the change over time in inequality as measured by the
80/20 ratio for w1a;t to changes in quantities of observables. Then, they attribute any
additional change in inequality in w2a;t to a change in prices of observables. Finally,
they attribute any additional changes in inequality in w3a;t beyond those found for
w2a;t to changes in the distribution of unobservables (changes in prices and quantities
of unobservables). Formally, taking time differences for RX;t;Rb;t, and Ru;t, we get:
RX;t  RX;t1 ¼ R1w;t  R1w;t1; ð29Þ
Rb;t  Rb;t1 ¼ R2w;t  R1w;t
 
 R2w;t1  R1w;t1
 
; ð30Þ
Ru;t  Ru;t1 ¼ R3w;t  R2w;t
 




Rw;t  Rw;t1 ¼ ðRX;t  RX;t1Þ þ ðRb;t  Rb;t1Þ þ ðRu;t  Ru;t1Þ: ð32Þ
To implement the methodology of Juhn et al. (1993), we first estimate Eq. (17)
using OLS for each year. We consider a traditional Mincer specification by
including as covariates the average years of schooling and years of potential
experience in linear and squared forms. Next, we rank the regression residuals in
ascending order for each year and divide them into percentiles. Then, to estimate the
average distribution during the periods t  1 and t, we perform the same procedure
but use the regression residuals of the estimates for years t  1 and t. For each
percentile, we estimate the mean to create a discrete approximation of
F
1ðHa;t=Xa;tÞ. Then, to construct wages in Eqs. (19) and (20), we assign to each
percentile in the residuals distribution in year t the mean value in the distribution F.
Finally, b in Eq. (19) is built as the simple average of the estimated coefficient for
the reference period.10
Azevedo et al. (2013a) propose the following adaptation. Denote by s a fixed
time period (for instance, 1990). We can rewrite Eqs. (19)–(21) as:
glnw1a;t ¼ Xa;tbs þ F1s ðHa;t=Xa;tÞ; ð33Þ
glnw1a;t ¼ Xa;tbt þ F1s ðHa;t=Xa;tÞ; ð34Þ
glnw3a;t ¼ Xa;tbt þ F1ðHa;t=Xa;tÞ ¼ lnwa;t: ð35Þ
After computing Eqs. (33)–(35), we follow the same steps as in Juhn et al. (1993).
Tables 4 and 5 present the results.
10 We also perform the same exercise using quintiles instead of percentiles. The main conclusions remain
under this alternative methodology.
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We observe in Tables 4 and 5 that observable characteristics (experience and
education) and observable prices (returns to education and experience) are by far the
most important factors that account for the rise in overall wage inequality in
1990–2000 and the subsequent fall after 2000. However, the relative importance of
each factor varies in the two periods. Before 2000 the relative price of skills plays
the main role, whereas after 2000, observable characteristics are the main factor
behind the decline in income inequality.
Next, we analyze the trends in the main observable price and quantity: the
education wage premium and the level of educational attainment. We first present
the Mincerian ‘‘return to education’’ for the whole period.11 The Mincer coefficient
measures the average wage premium that agents receive in the labor market as their
years of schooling increase. Figure 12 shows that the Mincer coefficient exhibits an
inverted U-shape. The education wage premium rises before 2000 but falls after
2000. A rise in the education premium coincides with the period of increasing wage
inequality, whereas its fall resembles the fall in wage inequality. This consistent
pattern of the Mincer coefficient and inequality is, in part, explained by the big
educational gap that exists between the fifth and first quintiles.
To study not only the movement of the average return to education (in Mincer’s
sense) but also the evolution of the wage premium for higher education, we estimate
the following empirical model:
Table 4 Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition
Period Levels Percentages (%)
Observables Prices Unobservables Observables Prices Unobservables
1990–2000 0.53 1.06 -1.07 102.45 204.22 -206.67
2000–2011 -2.15 -0.67 0.35 86.95 27.28 -14.23
Table 5 Azevedo et al. (2013a) decomposition
Period Levels Percentages (%)
Observables Prices Unobservables Observables Prices Unobservables
1990–2000 0.54 1.23 -1.25 104.15 235.81 -239.97
2000–2011 -2.13 -0.47 0.13 86.15 18.99 -5.14
11 ‘‘Return’’ is in quotation marks, because it is the ex-post average growth rate of earnings with
schooling and not, in general, an internal rate of return or a marginal return that is appropriate for
evaluating the optimality of educational investment. It communicates how much average earnings
increase with schooling, but it is not informative on the optimality of educational investments, which
requires knowledge of the ex ante marginal rate of return. Only under specific assumptions can this
coefficient be interpreted as a rate of return (see Heckman et al. 2008 for a more detailed discussion). For
simplicity, we use interchangeably the terms ‘‘returns to education’’, ‘‘Mincerian returns to education’’,
and ‘‘skill premium’’, although the ex-post college wage premium and Mincerian returns to education
might not be the relevant rate of return on which individuals base their education decisions, as noted by
Heckman et al. (2008).
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lnwa;t ¼ d0;t þ Da;td1;t þ expa;td2;t þ exp2a;td3;t þ ua;t; ð36Þ
where lnwa;t is the log hourly wage for agent a in year t, Da;t is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if agent a had 16 or more years of education at time t, expa;t are years
of experience, and ua;t are the regression residuals.
In the empirical model described by Eq. (36), d1;t measures the increase in wages
that an agent with a college or higher education receives relative to an agent without
a college education. Figure 13 shows the change in this coefficient over the pre- and
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Fig. 13 Changes in returns to higher education
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during the pre-2000 period. During 2000–2011, the return to education shows a
decreasing trend.
Wage inequality depends not only on the changes in the education wage premium
but also on what group of the population is supplying more educated workers to the
labor market (the quantity effect). Table 6 presents the fraction of agents ages 18 or
older who completed a college education in the first and fifth quintiles as well as in
the whole population. We observe in Table 6 that the educational attainment of the
poorest quintile slightly worsened until 1998; after that, the fraction of the
population that attained higher education increased (even though its level was still
low relative to that of the fifth quintile). The educational attainment level of the
richest quintile shows a different pattern. The fraction of agents in the fifth quintile
with a completed higher education strongly increases during 1990–2000 but is
relatively flat after 2000. Therefore, we observe a strong rise of inequality in
educational attainment during the pre-2000 period, which becomes more moderate
during the post-2000 period. Table 7 presents the enrollment rates of the college-
aged population. We observe that the enrollment rates of the richest quintile
increase faster than those of the poorest quintile during the earlier decades of the
period analyzed. The opposite fact is observed in the later decades. Thus, Table 7
also unveils a reverting trend in human capital inequality between the poorest and
the richest quintiles over the period analyzed.
We end the discussion in next subsection by discussing potential explanations for
the price effect, specifically, the rise and fall in the Mincerian return to higher
education.
Table 6 Educational attainment, 1990–2011 Source: CASEN 1990–2011
Quintile/year 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009 2011
1st quintile 1.07 1.02 1.03 0.92 0.84 1.32 1.45 2.44 2.28 2.34
5th quintile 24.74 24.44 27.17 29.91 33.78 36.4 38.14 35.82 39.46 38.88
All 7.38 7.15 8.02 9.06 9.79 10.40 11.43 11.37 12.74 12.02
Statistics are the percentage of population age 18 years or older with 16 (or more) years of schooling over
the population age 18 years or older, by quintile of per capita household income
Table 7 College enrollment rates, 1990–2011 Source: CASEN 1990–2011
Quintile/year 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009 2011
1st quintile 3.37 5.34 6.43 6.59 6.16 6.95 10.01 13.63 16.54 22.06
5th quintile 32.27 30.98 43.42 49.69 51.55 51.93 57.63 52.84 54.29 58.97
All 12.2 12.84 18.05 20.98 20.96 21.96 26.09 27.40 28.82 33.3
Statistics are the percentage of the population between 18 and 24 years of age enrolled in a higher
education institution, by quintile of per capita household income
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5.1 Discussion: the rise and fall of the skill premium
In this section, we discuss the forces behind the rise and fall of the skill premium in
Chile. Based on the seminal work by Katz and Murphy (1992), we have that the
movement in the premium on higher education reflects a race between supply and
demand forces. In periods where the demand for education grows faster than the
supply, the return to education (more precisely, the higher education wage premium
in the labor market) rises. The opposite phenomenon occurs when the supply grows
faster than the demand. In the context of the evidence presented in the previous
section, the rising Mincerian return to education in the pre-2000 period reflects a
faster relative increase of the demand for more skilled workers. Conversely, its
decline during the post-2000 period reflects a relatively slower rise in the demand
for more educated workers. In the rest of this section, we will discuss the potential
forces behind the changes in the supply of and demand for skilled workers that
could be consistent with the evidence on the rise and fall of the skill premium in
Chile documented above.
We have shown, in Tables 6 and 7, the rise in the educational attainment of the
labor force and the college enrollment rates experienced by the economy over the
past two decades. Both variables are used in the literature as a proxy for the
evolution of the supply of skilled workers (e.g., Murphy and Welch 2001). This
positive supply shift of more educated workers is, in part, consistent with the higher
return to education observed in the earlier decades of the period of analysis. In turn,
the fall in the return to higher education observed during the post-2000 period
reflects the gradual entry of new cohorts of college educated agents into the labor
market, the exit of the older and less educated cohorts, and a slower relative growth
of the demand for skilled workers. The human capital accumulation process
described by Tables 6 and 7 was also fueled by important reforms to the higher
education market initiated at the beginning of the 1980s. Those reforms expanded
and diversified the supply of higher education institutions, which probably impacted
more significantly the educational choice of the poorer quintiles. We will briefly
describe those reforms.
The Military Government, based on an official diagnosis of the Chilean higher
education market, carried out at the beginning of the 1980s an important education
reform that included a series of legislative changes that led to a major reduction in
barriers to entry to the higher education market for private providers. The new
regime was instituted after the enactment of Decree Law 3541 of 1980, which
granted special powers to the Head of State to restructure the country’s universities.
Under that decree, the Military Government issued a set of norms throughout 1981,
which, in combination, make up the new legislative regime of the Chilean higher
education market. Among the guiding principles of the reform are (1) the opening of
higher education to the market on the basis of academic freedom, understood as the
freedom to create and support educational institutions, (2) a reduction in the barriers
to entry for providers, and (3) a further fostering of competition as a source of
quality improvements in the supply of education.
The liberalization of tertiary education in 1980 is arguably the largest supply
shock in education policy during the last three decades in Chile (see Brunner
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1993, 2008). As a result of the 1980 reform, both the institutional composition and
the financing of Chilean higher education underwent dramatic changes. New
establishments mushroomed. More than 300 institutions, practically all private in
nature, were created from 1980 to 1990, thus dramatically changing the shape of the
higher education system.
Following the expansion and diversification of higher education, the question of
quality assurance began to be raised. The first steps towards a quality assurance
system were taken in the mid-1990s with the creation of the Education Council,
which started implementing a compulsory licensing system for some educational
institutions. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, institutions were created to develop
voluntary program accreditation at the undergraduate and graduate levels, including
the Commission for the Evaluation of Undergraduate Programs (CEUP) in 1999 and
the Commission for the Evaluation of Postgraduate Programs in 2000. In 2004,
CEUP also started implementing accreditation at the institutional level. After this
learning period, in 2006, Law 20.129 set up the National Higher Education Quality
Assurance System, creating new quality assurance institutions and functions.
Therefore, on the supply side, the endogenous response of agents to the higher
returns to education was fueled by a reform of the education system initiated at the
beginning of the 1980s, which expanded and diversified the supply of higher
education institutions. In addition, in the middle of the 1990s, a new infrastructure
of higher education quality assurance was built. This new infrastructure, comprising
initially the Education Council and, later, the commissions for the evaluation of
undergraduate and postgraduate programs and the National Higher Education
Quality Assurance System, has strengthened the focus on the quality of Chilean
higher education institutions since the mid-to-late 1990s. Therefore, the supply of
skilled workers rose during the period 1990–2011, but especially since the mid-to-
late 1990s, in terms of both enrollment in higher education and its quality.
Regarding the demand forces, the growth of the Chilean economy has been
driven by and has triggered several forces that have directly affected the demand for
different skills in the labor market. First, a change inherent to the process of a
country’s economic development is that the service sector grows and the
manufacturing sector shrinks. This structural economic transformation moves
output from manufacturing to services. Given that the service economy is more
knowledge intensive and less physically intensive, the demand for skilled labor
increases. This process through which the service economy rises as the economy
develops and in turn pushes up the education premium has been well documented by
Buera and Kaboski (2012) for the U.S. economy. The Latin American economies, in
general, and Chile, in particular, have not been exempt from this process, as is well
documented by De la Torre et al. (2013).
De la Torre et al. (2013) show that economic activity in Latin American
countries (Chile included) in the past decades has been shifting from manufacturing
to services, a process that they call ‘‘tertiarisation’’. The authors argue that the rise
of services that the region has experienced seems to be more a general consequence
of the region’s development than a by-product of the commodity boom, in line with
the evidence that Buera and Kaboski (2012) document for the US economy.
Moreover, the authors present conclusive evidence that the contribution to value-
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added growth in Latin America in the past decades has not been circumscribed to
low-skilled activities or construction; on the contrary, the contribution to growth has
been more significant in high-skilled services.
De la Torre et al. (2013) also present data on the skill composition by sector
which indicates that services are the sector in Latin American countries that uses the
highest share of educated workers. Moreover, they document that the service sector
has become more skill-intensive than the manufacturing sector and that no decline is
observed in the share of the labor force in skill-intensive sectors relative to the rest.
Sectors with higher education intensity grew comparatively more, which contradicts
the hypothesis of a shift towards low-skill sectors. Therefore, the rise of the service
economy seems to be a force pushing up the relative demand for more educated
workers during the past decades in Chile and the region, in line with the process
described by Buera and Kaboski (2012).
In addition, in a developing economy, such as Chile, international trade is one of
the main forces through which foreign technologies are absorbed (Parente and
Precott 1994). In parallel, there is vast empirical evidence that technological change
is skill-biased (see Katz and Murphy 1992; Berman et al. 1998; Borjas et al. 1997;
Acemoglu 2002, among others). That is, technological improvements increase the
relative productivity of more skilled workers, which also increases the relative
demand for those types of workers. For Chile, Gallego (2012) also documents that
the technological change has been biased toward more skilled workers. Therefore,
the rapid trade liberalization experienced by the Chilean economy and the skill bias
of the new technologies absorbed by the country should have pushed up the relative
demand for skilled workers in the past decades.
Trade liberalization also affects the relative demand for different types of
workers through other channels. A traditional trade theorem, the Stolper–Samuelson
effect, predicts that as countries open their economies to international trade,
developed countries will specialize in goods whose production is more intensive in
skilled workers, while less developed countries will specialize in goods that require
less skilled workers. The main prediction of these models is that the demand for
skilled workers should rise in developed countries and decrease in less developed
countries. However, in developing countries, there is a second force that
counterbalances the Stolper–Samuelson effect: capital-skill complementarity, which
means that capital is more complementary to more educated workers. When
economies increase their imports of capital goods, the relative productivity of more
educated workers rises and, consequently, the relative demand for these workers
increases. Internationally, the hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity is
empirically supported by the seminal work of Krusell et al. (2000). In a recent
paper, Correa et al. (2016) empirically confirm the existence of capital-skill
complementarity in the Chilean economy.
Therefore, on the demand side, all of the forces described above are both engines
of economic growth and sources of increases in the relative productivity of more
educated workers and, thus, the relative demand for those workers. The supply and
demand elements discussed above, together with the empirical evidence throughout
this paper, suggest that it is a race between the demand for and the supply of
educated workers in the labor market that is, in the end, behind the rise and fall of
Lat Am Econ Rev  (2017) 26:3 Page 27 of 31  3 
123
wage inequality. Long-term forces inherent to economic development constantly
push up the relative demand for skilled workers. At the beginning of the process, the
response of the supply is slower than the increase in the demand. Therefore, the
returns to education rise, and this higher premium on education increases income
inequality.
However, the gradual entry of new cohorts of college graduates into the labor
market together with the retirement of older less educated cohorts increase the
supply of more educated workers. When the supply begins to grow faster than the
demand, inequality starts falling. In the case of Chile, the human capital
accumulation process was also fueled by the education reforms initiated in the
1980s that expanded and diversified the supply of higher education and by the
flourishing of higher education quality assurance since the mid-to-late 1990s.12
Therefore, the only way of making the decline of inequality observed during the
period 2000–2011 sustainable is by facilitating access to education for more
vulnerable groups. In this way, those groups would be able to reap the higher returns
to education, and the incipient decreasing trend in income inequality documented in
this paper would become a long-term trend.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents evidence on the evolution of income inequality in Chile during
the past two decades. We document a rise and fall in income inequality during the
period 1990–2011. Specifically, income inequality rises before 2000 and then
decreases after 2000. The only exception is the period 2006–2009, when income
inequality increases. We performed several decompositions to isolate the quanti-
tative contribution of the different components of inequality. Our results can be
summarized as follows:
1. Labor income inequality is the main contributor to the observed movements in
overall inequality. Non-labor income plays only a minor role.
2. Employment gaps between the richest and poorest quintiles are particularly
relevant for understanding the deviations from the increasing trend of inequality
during the 1990–2000 period and from the decreasing trend during the
2000–2011 period. For instance, employment gaps account for most of the
increase in labor income inequality from 2003 to 2009.
3. When the employment gaps are kept constant over time, the rise and fall in
labor income inequality are especially clear. We observe a continuous increase
in labor income inequality during the 1990–2000 period among individuals who
report positive hours worked, and a pronounced fall after 2000.
12 Institutional labor market factors seem not to have played an important role during the period of
analysis. Data from the unemployment insurance system reveal that for only a small fraction of the labor
force has the minimum wage been binding during the past decades. In addition, data collected by the
OECD show that the level of unionization of the labor force has remained relatively stable during the past
decades.
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4. Hourly wage inequality accounts for most of the rise and fall in labor income
inequality. The gap in hours worked, conditional on being employed, stays
relatively constant over the whole period.
5. Performing a decomposition of inequality in hourly wages into its three main
components (observable characteristics, prices of skills, and unobservables), we
find that observable characteristics of workers and relative prices of different
skills account for most of the changes in overall wage inequality.
6. Specifically, inverted U-shaped trends in educational attainment gaps and in the
Mincerian returns to education are the main factors behind the inverted
U-shaped trend in the inequality in hourly wages.
The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with a story in which several
forces inherent to economic growth increase the demand for more educated workers
and, therefore, the returns to education and inequality in earnings. As the supply of
educated workers begins to respond (encouraged by the higher returns to education),
the rise in income inequality is moderated or even reversed.
In this way, the phenomenon reported for Chile shares several characteristics
with the one observed in other countries of the region, as discussed in Sect. 2. Those
common elements are the following: (1) the rise and fall in income inequality during
two well-marked sub periods, 1990–2000 and 2000–2011, respectively; (2) the
relatively greater contribution of labor markets to changes in overall inequality; (3)
the existence of a skill premium that first widens and then shrinks during the periods
when labor income inequality rises and falls, respectively; (4) an upgrading of the
labor force; and (5) the existence of demand forces linked with economic growth
that fuel the relative demand for more educated workers. Of course, some
differences exist across countries; for instance, the fact that institutional labor
market factors seem to be more relevant in some countries than in others. However,
the evidence presented for Chile in this article reinforces the view for the region that
income inequality seems to be, in general, the result of a race between the demand
for skilled workers that goes hand in hand with the economic development of
countries and the capacity of the education system to provide the skills that the labor
market demands more intensively. The evidence discussed in Sect. 2 and the results
presented in this article for Chile point to education policies as the most effective
way of reducing income inequality levels in the long term.
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